Pascal’s Wager - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1998年5月2日 · “Pascal’s Wager” is the name given to an argument due to Blaise Pascal for believing, or for at least taking steps to believe, in God.
Notes to Pascal’s Wager - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Causal decision theory replaces evidential decision theory’s conditional probabilities with probabilities that capture the degree of causal relevance of an action to each state. There are …
Pascal’s Wager - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1998年5月2日 · We can think of Pascal’s Wager as having three premises: the first concerns the decision matrix of rewards, the second concerns the probability that you should give to God’s …
Notes to Pascal's Wager - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Notes to Pascal's Wager. 1. Those interested in the reconstruction over the years of the text itself should consult Lafuma 1954. 2. Our demarcation of the arguments follows that of Hacking …
Pascal's Wager - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1998年5月2日 · We can think of Pascal's Wager as having three premises: the first concerns the decision matrix of rewards, the second concerns the probability that you should give to God's …
Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God - Stanford Encyclopedia of …
2004年8月16日 · Pascal’s Wager, for instance, is intended to provide strong support for theism; while James’s Will to Believe argument is intended to provide weak support.
Infinity - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2021年4月29日 · Pascal maintains that we cannot know whether God exists or not, but he argues that we can solve the decision problem of whether or not to ‘wager for God’—roughly, to …
Blaise Pascal - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2007年8月21日 · One of the most famous and most extensive notes in the Pensées (Fragment 397: II, 676–81) is the so-called ‘wager’ in favour of belief in God. Cole (1995, Chapter 15) …
Causal Decision Theory - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2008年10月25日 · Problems such as Pascal’s Wager and the St. Petersburg paradox suggest that decision theory needs a means of handling infinite utilities and expected utilities. Suppose …
Fideism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2005年5月6日 · Pascal insists that faith can nevertheless be rational in the absence of proof – i.e., that it is rational in a prudential rather than an epistemic sense. It is here that he introduces his …